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INTERPRETATION OF MISSOURI DAMAGE ACT.
A very interesting question of judicial history in the in-
terpretation of the Misouri statutes occurs in the widely
differing and contradictory constructions of the Missouri
Damage Act. It shows the laborious struggle of our appel-
late courts to make a reasonable and enforceable rule as to
the measure of damages where the wording of the statute
has failed.
The Missouri Statute allowing a recovery for wrongful
death or commonly known as section 5425 of the Damage
Act, R. S. Mo. 1909, (section 4217 I. S. Mo., 1919.) reads in
part as follows: Every such party causing such wrongful
death "shall forfeit and pay as a penalty, for every such
person, employee or passenger so dying, the sum of not less
than $2,000, and not exceeding $10,000, in the discretion of
the jury."
The fact that this section of the statute was poorly writ-
ten by the legislators and things left unsaia which they
probably intended should be included in its construction has
caused much controversy and conflict of authority in the
higher courts of our State.
Is the statute penal, that is, does it give a penalty by way
of punishment for the death; or is it compensatory and does
it merely award damages for the actual pecuniary loss to
the family and dependents of the deceased; or is it both penal
and compensatory?
At the common law no action or penalty was to be had
against a defendant who had wrongfully caused the death of
another person. However, since the middle of the nineteenth
century, the different states have enacted statutes which give
an action to the family or dependents of a deceased person,
when his death is brought about by the negligence or wrong-
ful act of another person. Some of the statutes allow the
recovery of a penalty for the death while others allow simply
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the recovery of compensatory damages for the pecuniary
loss suffered.
The first statute of this kind, the origina! Missouri Lord
Campbell's Act, was enaeted in this State as early as 1855.
The statute, (General Statutes of 1855, p. 647.) as originally
passed by the Legislature, allowed the recovery of a fixed
sum of $5,000, as a penalty for death by wrongful act. This
statute remained in effect for many years and was not
changed, except as to minor details, until 1905 when it was
t1nclided by the enactment of the statute which is in effect
today, supra. The original statute was construed by the
courts as a penal statute and any party invoking it was re-
quired to sue for the full amount of $5,000, and no recovery
could be more nor less than that amount. The courts of our
State held that the statute had no compensatory features
and allowed merely the recovery of a penalty, prior to the
amendment of 1905.' Young v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain &
Southern Ry. Co.,2 decided in 1910, held that the statute as
amended in 1905 hilowed the recovery of a penalty for the
death but no Compensatory damages for the actual loss suf-
fercd. In that case, the court speaks, at length, of the statute
before and after the amendment of 1905 and in the couirse
of the opinion, says: "The words 'as a penalty' inserted by
the amendment add nothing to the meaning and effect of the
section; we have always held it a penal statute, but the plac.
ing of a minimum and maximum limit to the amount of the
penalty introduces an entirely new feature."
In the recent case of Grier v. Kansas City & Clay County
Ry. Co.,3 decided in March, 1921, the Supreme Court hands
down what is,probably the most reasonable and correct con-
struction of this section of the statute.
The facts in that case were, briefly, as follows: Ralph W.
Grier, a young attorney of St. Joseph, Missouri, was killed
1. Casey v. St. Louis Transit Co., 205 Mo. 721; LeMay V. Mo. Pac.
Ry. Co., 105 Mo. 361; Guenther v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry.,
109 Mo. 18; King v. Railroad, 130 Mo. App. 863.
2. 227 Mo. 307.
3. 228 S. W. 454.
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in an acident .m the Kansas City & SL Joseph Interurban
Li while goin frvv St JaesqA to Kansas City, and while
on the outkirts of North KAnsa City in November, 1917.
His injury which privved fatal 'as msa.d by the unskillful-
new and uelig e f the cLmpan-y's .erant& He had no
family or dependents wbatvex. His administrator sued for
the maximum pena hy otf $SLIMX, given by the statute, and
rfovered the full awm-nt in the Ciruit Court of Buchanan
County.
Upon appeal by the oompa.ny, the Supreme Court through
Raeland, C.. atrmed the vrdict of the lower court, allowing
the full $10,XV0, as a penuslty far the deah. The court held that
section 42:5 of the satut* ws wholly penal and not partly
penal and partly xpentory. as was held in the earlier
case of Boyd v. Mo, Pw% R4.' It was held that the words
of the statute txken in their plain and ordinary meaning,
without speculation by the courus as to the intention of the
Legislature. m,,ant that the ,xre-ry was a penalty between
the limits of $ &2.W and $ OA\k\ in the disaretion of the jury.
It was further held habt the wxrds. forfeiI a*d pay imply a
Ivnalty and tbhe wor%. &C Y. eapressly say as much.
and upxo the fase of the satute suh was plainly the inten-
tion of the Legisiture.
By so holding, the Sulvme Court overruled its decisions
in Boyd v. Mo. Prai. R. . case decided in 1913 and
one which has -aus d mu-h %is,-satisfaction, espe6ally to the
Courts of Appeal of the Sae. This was the second appeal
of that -ase and is e&.mm .- known as the Second Boyd case.
In that case, the txturl, in xinstruing section 542. held that
the statute was partly, penal and partky compensatory. That
it was penal as to the minimum limitation of $,000. and com-
pensatory as to all rve.ry abjure that amount up to the
maximum limit of $10L.CO The decision of the case affords
k. NS WO lit.
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an illustration of the attempt to make judicial legislation
supply in omission, and to contravene the express words of
the statute because the court did not believe that the statute,
as it read upon its face, could be put into practical operation.
It seems to me that there was no real reason given for the
decision in that case. The principal reason for the decision
seems to be that the Legislature did not specifically prescribe
the limits within which juries could exercise their discretion,
except in a very broad manner and gave no rules for the exer-
cise of such a wide discretion. Therefore, the Supreme Court
undertook to prescribe the limits of such discretion and what
facts it should act upon. And finally, in attempting to read
something into the statute which was omitted and in the face
of the express words of the section, they infer that it was
the intention of the Legislature to limit the penal feature of
the statute to the minimum of $2,000, and all recovery above
that amount and up to $10,000, to compensatory damages or
the actual pecuniary loss to the family or dependents, brought
about by the death. But Ragland, C., in the Grier case says:
"And if the omission in respect to the facts that the jury
may consider as a guide to their discretion is to be supplied
by construction, such cornstruction must also be not inconsis-
tent with the express language declaring that the sum fixed
by them shall be forfeited and paid as a penalty." So the
Supreme Court impliedly overruled the Second Boyd case in
the recent decision.
There have been quite a number of decisions handed
down since the Second Boyd case was decided which seem to
doubt the soundness of the law laid down therein. In the
case of Johnson v. Chi., Mil. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 5 decided
in 1917, Judge Faris's opinion seems to question the pro-
priety of that ruling. There are numerous decisions in the
Courts of Appeal which have reluctantly followed the riding
5. 270 Mo. 418.
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of the Second Boyd ease.' Sturjis, Judge, in a concurring
opinion in Harshaw v. Railroad,7 says: "It seems to me
nothing but judicial legislation to suppress the penal feature
of the statute after passing the minimum amount allowed
to be recovered and not only to read into the statute a com-
pensatory feature after reaching that amount, based largely,
if not entirely on the discretion given to the jury in fixing the
amount, but to make the statute purely and solely compensa-
tory with a measure of damages borrowed from the next and
radically different section." In Lasater v. St. Louis & Iron
Mountain Ry. Co.,' following the Second Boyd case, the Court
says:" Under the Constitution, we are bound by the last con-
trolling decision of the Supreme Court. This ruling is con-
clusive upon us and it is not for us to indicate what our views
may be as to the propriety thereof."
It may plausibly be contended that the rule in the Second
Boyd case is a better one than that now declared in the Grier
case, holding that the statute is wholly penal. The Legislature
probably intended that the statute should have both penal and
compensatory features, but they wrote into the law only the
penal feature. Nowhere in the section is the word, "dam-
ages" used, or any other words to indicate that it is to give
compensation for any pecuniary loss. But it is for the courts,
regardless of what they think is the better rule, to construe
the statute as written and not to speculate as to the legislative
intent. They may carry construction a long way, but they
must not go to The extent of disregarding the express words
of a statute in favor of what they think is a better or more
reasonable rule that the one expressed. The courts can only
interpret statutes, not write them. In this case, the remedy
seems to be an amendment or revision of the statute and not
a roundabout construction by the courts.
6. Johnson v. Railroad, 174 Mo. App. 16; Lasater T. Railroad, 177
Mo. App. 535: Harshaw v. Railroad, 173 Mo. App. 459.
7. 173 Mo. App. 45.
8. 177 Mo. App. 535.
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Probably the best rule of all is that set forth in the first
appeal of the Boyd case," commonly known as the First Boyd
case. In that decision, the court held that section 5425 was
penal as to the minimum amount of $2,000, and that above
that amount and up to $10,000, both compensatory and penal
features inhered in the statute. But the courts cannot put
such a construction on the section as it now stands, for
athough the Legislature might have intended something else,
it certainly gave us a purely penal statute in plain and unam-
biguous terms and this our tribunals must follow.
ROBERT W. BARRow, JR., '22.
9. 236 Mo. 54.
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